USA v. Kamara by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-31-2008 
USA v. Kamara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Kamara" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 27. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/27 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 06-2512
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
       v.
OUMAR KAMARA,
Appellant
                                                   
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 05-cr-00120)
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
                                                  
Argued on December 11, 2008
Before: McKEE, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 31, 2008)
David L. McColgin, Esquire  
Michael D. Raffaele, Esquire  (Argued)
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Court Division
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA   19106
Counsel for Appellant
2Virgil B. Walker, Esquire (Argued)
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esquire
Office of the United States Attorney
Suite 1250
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA   19106
Counsel for Appellee
                       
O P I N I O N 
                      
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Oumar Kamara appeals two issues arising from his conviction of preventing his
deportation under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (a)(1)(c).  The first issue is whether the District
Court erred in precluding Kamara’s defense of justification.  The second issue is whether
the District Court erred when it refused to reveal the contents of three jury questions to
Kamara.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
I.  Background and Procedural History
Because the facts are well known to the parties, we will discuss them only briefly. 
A jury empaneled in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania convicted Oumar Kamara of preventing and hampering his departure from
the United States.  The District Court then imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’
3imprisonment, a term of supervised release of three years, a $2,500 fine, and a special
assessment of $100. 
Before trial, Kamara indicated his intent to present a justification defense.  The
government, in response, filed a motion in limine to preclude that defense.  The District
Court granted the government’s motion.  At the close of the first day of trial, just before
closing arguments, the District Court informed the parties that it had received three
questions from the jury.  It did not share the contents with either party; instead, it sealed
the questions. 
II.  Analysis
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Kamara first argues that he presented a prima facie showing on justification and
was thus entitled to present it to the jury.  We will review the District Court’s ruling on 
Kamara’s use of the justification defense de novo.  See United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d
91, 93–98 (3d Cir. 2008).   We will moreover view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Kamara.  United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1991).
To present a justification defense to the jury, a defendant must satisfy four
requirements:  (1) he was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily
injury, (2) he did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he could be forced to
engage in criminal conduct, (3) he had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the
4criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm), and (4) there is a direct causal
relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm. 
Alston, 526 F.3d at 95; Paolello, 951 F.2d at 540.  
The District Court found that Kamara may have suffered from the Sierra Leone
government in the past, but that he had not adduced sufficient evidence that the political
climate in Sierra Leone is still in a condition that he would face imminent harm upon his
return.  We agree with the District Court that Kamara did not adduce sufficient evidence
for prong one.  The District Court thus did not err.
Kamara next argues that the District Court’s decision to seal the jury questions
deprived him of his due process rights and his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.  Three questions are at issue:  (1) “Is U.S. Government responsible for the
return of your safety to your country?”; (2) “What was he convicted of?”; and (3) “What
is a habeas corpus appeal? Regarding NY Supreme Court decision?”  The government
concedes that the District Court erred.  It, however, argues that the error was harmless. 
A defendant’s constitutional right to be present at every stage of his criminal 
proceeding is grounded in the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.  United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2003); see United
States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985).  The right is also mandated by Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 43.  Toliver, 330 F.3d at 611.  The harmless-error standard applies
to Rule 43 violations; this standard requires that the “government prove beyond a
5reasonable doubt that the defendant was uninjured by the error.”  Id. at 613.  That means
that “there must be ‘no reasonable possibility’ of prejudice for an error to be deemed
harmless.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 1980)).
Kamara argues that he was harmed when the District Court withheld question one
 because the jury concluded that he was not a credible witness.  But the District Court did
instruct the jury, after telling it that it would not answer the three questions, that “[y]ou
are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness.”  We have long “presum[ed] that
juries follow the instructions given by district courts.”  United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d
324, 330 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir.
1993)).  Kamara’s credibility was thus not harmed.  
Kamara’s arguments for questions two and three also fail.  His argument for both
of these questions is the same:  He was harmed because the jury might have researched
the answers to these questions on its own and found prejudicial information.  But the
District Court twice instructed the jury not to consult outside sources.  The jury is, of
course, presumed to have not strayed from the District Court’s mandate.   See Hakim, 344
F.3d at 330.  There was no reasonable possibility of prejudice for Kamara.  The
government therefore carried its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kamara
was uninjured by the error.  
III.  Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
